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Abstract
This paper studies how different unionisation structures affect firm productivity, firm
performance, and consumer welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous
firms and free entry. While centralised bargaining induces tougher selection among hetero-
geneous producers and thus increases average productivity, firm-level bargaining allows less
productive entrants to remain in the market. Centralised bargaining also results in higher
average output and profit levels than either decentralised bargaining or a competitive labour
market. From a welfare perspective, the choice between centralised and decentralised bar-
gaining involves a potential trade-off between product variety and product prices. Extending
the model to a two-country setup, I furthermore show that the positive effect of centralised
bargaining on average productivity can be overturned when firms face international low-wage
competition.
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1 Introduction
Since the late 1970s, there has been a tendency among OECD countries to grant greater flexi-
bility in the determination of wages. In fact, nine out of twenty-one member countries examined
by the OECD (2004)1 have allowed wages to adjust more freely to local conditions at the firm
level, while not a single member country has moved to more centralised bargaining structures.
In many European OECD countries, however, wages continue to be predominantly determined
in industry-level collective agreements that specify an uniform wage rate common to all firms in
an industry. This paper examines how different bargaining structures affect firm productivity,
firm performance and consumer welfare in the long run.
What unions do to productivity and firm performance has been the topic of extensive research
(cf. Metcalf, 2003, and Hirsch, 2004, for recent surveys). Conventional wisdom suggests that by
raising pay unions hurt the financial performance of firms - ‘unless there is a roughly equivalent
union effect on productivity’ (Metcalf, 2003: 118). Most of the theoretical literature on the
relation between unionisation and productivity has focused on the incentives of unionised firms
to innovate. Early studies by Grout (1984) and van der Ploeg (1987) have pointed to a hold-up
problem associated with unionisation. Once a firm has incurred the sunk costs of investment,
unions can capture part of the innovation rent by demanding higher wages. The incentives of
firms to innovate are therefore decreasing in union bargaining power. If firms, however, invest
strategically so as to increase their market shares and profits, unionised enterprises may enjoy
a strategic advantage over their non-unionised competitors (cf. Tauman and Weiss, 1987; Ulph
and Ulph, 1994; Ulph and Ulph, 2001). Existing studies have focused on markets that are
characterised by a small and fixed number of firms. The market structure in these studies is
exogenously given. Unionisation, however, is likely to influence the number and, equally impor-
tant, the characteristics of firms that survive in the long-run; and financial performance depends
crucially on the market environment.
My objective in this paper is to analyse the interactions between bargaining structures, the
1The OCED does not assess wage setting institutions in central and eastern European OECD countries before
the 1990s. Data on the bargaining level are also not provided for Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Turkey and South
Korea.
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market environment and firm performance. To that end, I study a monopolistic competition
model in the spirit of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with heterogeneous firms and free entry. The
model incorporates both differences in firm productivity and endogenous mark-ups that respond
to the intensity of competition in a market. The intensity of competition is summarised by the
number of competing enterprises and their average price level. I distinguish between three dif-
ferent labour market regimes. Wages are either determined in a perfectly competitive labour
market, set by firm-specific unions, or fixed by a binding, sector-wide wage agreement. With
decentralised bargaining, wages are firm-specific and increase in productivity. With sector-level
bargaining, in contrast, wages are uniform, a singular wage rate that is binding for each and
every firm.
The model highlights two effects of unionisation that have been largely overlooked in previ-
ous work. First, sector-level bargaining (but not firm-level bargaining) induces tougher selec-
tion among heterogeneous producers and changes the productivity distribution among surviving
firms. In particular, by increasing wages for all firms, centralised bargaining acts a barrier to
entry for low-productivity firms. Second, both bargaining regimes discourage entry and decrease
competitive pressures by raising pay. Less intensive competition ceteris paribus results in higher
profits of surviving firms and allows less productive enterprise to remain in the market.
Compared to the competitive benchmark, centralised bargaining increases average productivity
(due to the selection effect) and boosts average output and profits (due to a combination of
the selection and the anti-competitive effect). Firm-level bargaining, in contrast, by allowing
less productive firms to survive, decreases average firm productivity and performance. At the
level of the individual firm, unionisation creates winners and losers. Decentralised agreements
benefit low productivity firms and harm high productivity firms, while the opposite is true for
centralised wage agreements. Regarding consumer welfare, the choice between the two bar-
gaining regimes can involve a trade-off between product prices and product variety. Firm-level
bargaining tends to increase product variety but also induces a less favourable price distribution
than centralised bargaining does.
My result that wage compression can be beneficial for productivity is related to earlier work
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by Moene and Wallerstein (1997). Formalising arguments made in the Swedish debate over
‘solidaristic’ bargaining (Rehn, 1952), Moene and Wallerstein (1997) compare the effects of de-
centralised and centralised wage bargaining in a vintage capital model of a small open economy
in which the price of output is exogenously given. Firms decide when to open new, more produc-
tive plants and when to shut down older, less productive ones. Under decentralised bargaining,
less productive plants pay lower wages and can therefore remain in the market for a longer time.
Centralised bargaining, in contrast, levels interplant wage differentials and drives less productive
plants out of the market. Apart from the very different modeling strategy, the principal differ-
ence between Moene and Wallerstein (1997) and the present paper is my focus on the intensity
of competition as an additional channel through which unionisation can influence productivity
and firm performance.2 The effects of different unionisation structures on firm productivity are
also examined by Haucap and Wey (2004) who find that centralised bargaining provides the
greatest incentives to innovate. They develop their argument in an unionised oligopoly model
with a fixed number of firms and focus on the interaction between bargaining structures and the
hold-up problem associated with unionisation. In contrast to their paper, I take a long-run per-
spective and examine how different unionisation structures affect firm performance in a model
with an endogenous market structure.
Extending the model to a two-country setup, I furthermore show that the positive effect cen-
tralised bargaining has on average productivity may vanish when firms face international low-
wage competition. While both the selection and the anti-competitive effects are still at work in
an open economy, collective bargaining, by increasing wages, also induces firms to relocate to
the non-unionised country. In such a setting, trade liberalisation can reduce competition, harm
productivity, and depress welfare in the high wage country.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model setting which I then use
in Section 3 to analyse the effects of unionisation structures on firm productivity and firm per-
formance. Section 4 considers consumer welfare and studies the impact of wage bargaining on
product variety and product prices. Section 5 discusses the implications of collective bargaining
2The present paper also shows that the choice between centralised and decentralised bargaining involves a
trade-off between product prices and product variety. In Moene and Wallerstein (1997), in contrast, output prices
are exogenously given.
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in an open economy. Section 6 summarises the main findings and concludes.
2 The Model Setting
I consider a two-sector economy with a representative consumer that inelastically supplies L
units of labour.3
2.1 Preferences and Demand
Preferences of the representative consumer are given by a quasilinear utility function defined
over a continuum of differentiated varieties and a homogeneous numeraire good:
U = qc0 + α
∫
qcidi−
1
2
γ
∫
(qci )
2di− 1
2
η
(∫
qcidi
)2
, (1)
where qc0 and q
c
i are the consumption levels of the numeraire good and of variety i ∈ Ω, respec-
tively. The parameters α > 0, η > 0 determine demand for the differentiated varieties relative to
the numeraire good, while γ > 0 is an (inverse) measure of the degree of product differentiation
between varieties. In the limit, as γ approaches 0, varieties become perfect substitutes and the
consumer is only concerned about the total consumption level over all varieties, Qc =
∫
i∈Ω q
c
idi.
Increases in α and decreases in η both boost demand for the differentiated varieties relative to
the numeraire.
The representative consumer maximises (1) subject to her budget constraint. Let Ω∗ ⊂ Ω be
the subset of varieties that are actually consumed (qci > 0). The constraint can then be written
as
I = qc0 +
∫
i∈Ω∗
piq
c
idi, (2)
where I represents income, pi is the price of variety i, and the price of the numeraire good
has been normalised to unity. Provided that the representative consumer has positive demand
for the numeraire, utility maximisation yields the following inverse demand function for each
3The model framework is similar to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) but in addition to their work I study the
effects of firm- and sector-level bargaining.
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consumed variety i:
pi = α− γqci − ηQc. (3)
Let N measure the number of consumed varieties in Ω∗. By inverting (3), demand for these
varieties can be expressed as follows:
qi =
α
ηN + γ
− 1
γ
pi +
ηN
ηN + γ
1
γ
p, ∀i ∈ Ω∗, (4)
where p = (1/N)
∫
i∈Ω∗ pidi is the average price of all consumed varieties.
With quasi-linear preferences all income effects are swept up by the numeraire good and qi is
independent of I. Therefore, admittedly, the model has a strong partial equilibrium flavour.
However, the price elasticity of demand derived from a quasi-linear utility function has the
considerable merit that it is not fixed as in the case of Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) preferences but related to the intensity of competition. In fact, the price elasticity
i ≡ | ∂qi∂pi
pi
qi
| = [(pmax/pi) − 1]−1 is inversely related to the upper price bound pmax, at which
demand for a variety i is driven down to zero (i.e. qi(pmax) = 0). The price bound is a summary
statistic for the ‘toughness’ of competition and given by
pmax ≡ 1
ηN + γ
(γα+ ηNp), (5)
which from (3) has to be smaller than α. The price bound is decreasing in the number of
competing enterprises and increasing in the average price level. In line with the empirical
evidence (see, for instance, Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005, and Tybout, 2003), an increase
in the intensity of competition, as indicated by a lower price bound, thus increases the price
elasticity of demand i at any given pi.
The indirect utility function associated with (1) can be used to assess welfare in the model.
Using the demand system (4) utility can be written as
U = IC +
1
2
(
η +
γ
N
)−1
(α− p)2 + 1
2
N
γ
θ2p, (6)
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where θ2p = (1/N)
∫
i∈Ω∗ (pi − p)2 di is the variance of prices. Welfare is thus decreasing in the
average price level p but rises with increases in the variance of prices θ2p. The utility function
also exhibits love of variety: holding the distribution of prices constant, welfare is increasing in
product variety N .
2.2 Production, Firm Behaviour and Entry
The numeraire good is sold in a perfectly competitive market and produced under constant
returns to scale. One unit of labour is required to produce one unit of the numeraire. As the
price of the numeraire is normalised to one, this implies a wage rate of unity in the numeraire
good sector.
In the differentiated product sector entry is costly. I take a long-run perspective and assume that
there exists a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants.4 In order to enter the market,
firms have to incur fixed start-up costs of fE . Unit costs of production are given by cw(c) with
c denoting unit labour requirement and w(c) being the (potentially firm-specific) wage rate.
Prior to entry the cost level c of a firm is unknown and each start-up learns its cost level only
after it has made the initial investment. The cost level is drawn from a common and known
distribution G(c) with support on [0, cM ]. Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), I assume
that the productivity draw 1/c follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k ≥ 1.5
Accordingly, the distribution of cost draws G(c) is given by
G(c) =
(
c
cM
)k
, c ∈ [0, cM ]. (7)
The shape parameter k determines the dispersion of cost draws. For k = 1 the latter is uniformly
distributed on the support. As k increases, the relative frequency of start-ups with high cost
levels increases as well.
After a firm has drawn its productivity parameter c it decides whether to remain in the market
4A short-run version of the model could be constructed by considering a fixed number of incumbents only (cf.
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
5Using firm-level data for manufacturing industries in 11 EU countries, Del Gatto et al. (2006) provide evidence
that the Pareto is a good approximation to the distribution of firm productivity across sectors and countries. They
suggest that on average the shape parameter k is close to two.
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and to start production. A firm will do so whenever it can cover its marginal costs and earn
nonnegative (gross) profits. All other entrants leave the market. Surviving firms then maximise
their profits Π(c) = [p(c)− cw(c)]q(c) taking the number of firms in the market and the average
price level as given. Using the demand function in (4), the first-order condition of a firm with
cost draw c reads
q(c) =
1
γ
[p(c)− cw(c)]. (8)
By solving equation (4) for the price level, substituting into (8) and also using the definition of
pmax the profit-maximising price p(c) can be written as
p(c) =
1
2
[pmax + cw(c)] . (9)
Hence, the price level does not only increase with unit costs cw(c) but is also (inversely) related
to the endogenous degree of competitiveness in the market. The profit-maximising output level
q(c), the corresponding profit level Π(c) and the markup µ(c) = p(c)− cw(c) of a firm can also
be expressed in terms of cw(c) and pmax only:
q(c) =
1
2γ
[pmax − cw(c)] , (10)
Π(c) =
1
4γ
[pmax − cw(c)]2 , (11)
µ(c) =
1
2
[pmax − cw(c)] . (12)
Now let cmax reference the cost level of a firm that just earns zero gross profits. This firm’s
profit-maximising price level is driven down to its marginal cost and the firm is therefore just
indifferent about remaining in the market. All firms with c < cmax are sufficiently productive to
earn positive gross profits and therefore stay in the market and start production. In contrast,
firms with cost levels above cmax exit.6 From (11) one can directly infer that
cmax =
pmax
w(cmax)
. (13)
6I will assume in the following that cmax is below cM and hence firms with a cost draw of between cmax and
cM have to leave the market.
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The cut-off level is therefore negatively related to the wage rate of the marginal firm but pos-
itively to the (endogenous) upper price bound pmax. Strong competitive pressures thus deter
entry of low productivity firms.
Prior to entry, i.e. before a prospective entrant has undertaken its initial investment, expected
gross profits are given by
∫ cmax
0 Π(c)dG(c). Unrestricted entry ensures that expected gross prof-
its are driven down to the fixed start-up cost fE and hence total expected profits are driven
down to zero. Accordingly, the free-entry equilibrium condition is given by
∫ cmax
0
Π(c)dG(c) = fE . (14)
2.3 Labor Market Regimes
Wages in the differentiated good sector can either be determined in a perfectly competitive
labour market, fixed by an industry-wide wage agreement, or set by a firm-specific union. These
three different scenarios ρ = P,U,D have the following properties:
1. Competitive Labour Market (ρ = P ).7 Wages in the differentiated good sector just equal
the outside option of workers. The latter is determined by the wage rate in the competitive
numeraire sector and equals unity. Therefore, in a flexible labour market the corresponding
wage rate wP is given by w = 1.
2. Centralised Bargaining (ρ = U). An industry union sets an uniform industry-wide wage
floor above the competitive wage rate. The wage is given by wU = θw = θ with θ > 1.
3. Decentralised Bargaining (ρ = D). Union activities are specific to a firm. In particular,
there exist N firm-level unions and each union sets a wage rate for its respective firm. In
doing so, unions maximise total firm-level rents [w(c)− w]E(c), where firm-level employ-
ment E(c) is given by cq(c). Solving the maximisation problem then yields a firm-specific
wage rate of wD(c) = (pmax + c)/2c.8
7This case has been analysed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
8Here I also assume that the bargaining takes place after the entry decision has been made and that firms
retain their right-to-manage.
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Centralised and decentralised wage bargaining differ in one key characteristic that is crucial for
the results to follow. While firm-level bargaining accounts for idiosyncratic firm characteristics,
an industry wide bargaining agreement specifies an uniform wage that is binding for each and
every firm. More specifically, under firm-level bargaining the wage rate is increasing in firm pro-
ductivity (or decreasing in the cost level c). In contrast, the wage rate under centralised wage
bargaining is independent from productivity and has to be paid by any firm in the differentiated
product sector. In fact, centralised bargaining agreements are frequently criticised for suppress-
ing regional or plant-specific wage differentials. Although the uniform wage rate wU could in
principle be derived endogenously, e.g. from a simple monopoly union model, a binding and
exogenously given wage θ > 1 is the simplest and most flexible way to model this characteristic
in the present context.9 Of course, as modelled here, the uniform wage rate wU > w could also
result from a (binding) minimum wage imposed by the state.
3 Unionization Structures, Productivity, and Firm Performance
In this section I use the model described above to analyse the effect of the different labour
market regimes on average firm productivity and firm performance. To build intuition, I start
with treating the market structure in the differentiated good sector, as summarised by pmax,
as exogenously given. By substituting the corresponding wage rate into equation (13) the cost
cut-off level cρmax under each labour market regime ρ = P,U,D can be written as
cPmax = p
P
max, c
U
max =
pUmax
θ
, cDmax = p
D
max. (15)
Inspecting equations (15) shows that for any exogenously given pρmax = pmax (∀ρ = P,U,D) the
cost cut-off level is lowest under centralised wage bargaining. Centralised bargaining induces
9In order to derive a closed form solution for wU from a monopoly union model, one has to assume that
the industry-level union does not take into account its influence on pmax. Introducing the free parameter θ will
furthermore prove helpful in the following as some of the results depend on the exact magnitude of the binding
wage floor. A possible parameter value of θ is the average wage rate received by workers under decentralised
bargaining.
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tougher selection by increasing marginal production costs of all firms. Entry of low productivity
enterprises is thus deterred. I call this the selection effect of centralised bargaining. With firm-
level bargaining, in contrast, wages are firm-specific. Less productive firms have to pay lower
wages and the marginal firm just pays the competitive unit wage wD(cmax) = 110. Consequently,
the selection effect is absent under firm-level bargaining; for any given pmax the cost cut-offs
cPmax and c
U
max are identical. Notice that this result is not specific to the monopoly union model
but follows from any model of union behaviour that yields w(cmax) = w.
Consider next the profit level of a firm producing with cost c under labour market regime
ρ = P,U,D:
ΠP (c) =
1
4γ
(pPmax − c)2, ΠU (c) =
1
4γ
(pUmax − cθ)2, ΠD(c) =
1
16γ
(pDmax − c)2. (16)
Given an exogenous level of competition, profits of a firm with cost draw c are highest in the
competitive environment. By increasing wages above the competitive level, both centralised
and decentralised wage bargaining ceteris paribus depress profits.11 Whether a firm is better off
under firm- or under sector-level bargaining depends on its cost draw c. Firms with a cost level
of above pmax/(2θ − 1) prefer the decentralised over the centralised bargaining mode. High-
productivity firms, in contrast, are better off under an uniform wage agreement.
So far I have taken pmax as exogenously given. In equilibrium, the cost cut-off level cmax and the
corresponding upper price bound pmax are determined by the free entry condition (14). Using
equations (15) and (16), the free entry condition for labour market regime ρ = P,U,D can be
rewritten as
∫ cPmax
0
1
4γ
(cPmax − c)2dG(c) = fE ,
∫ cUmax
0
θ2
4γ
(cUmax − c)2dG(c) = fE ,∫ cDmax
0
1
16γ
(cDmax − c)2dG(c) = fE . (17)
10Evaluating wD(c) at c = cmax yields pmax/2cmax + 1/2. From cmax = pmax/w(cmax), it then follows that
wD(cmax) = 1.
11The marginal firm under decentralised wage bargaining is an exception in this regard because it just has to
pay the competitive wage rate.
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The equilibrium cost cut-off levels and upper price bounds are then given by:12
cPmax = p
P
max =
[
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ(cM )kfE
]1/(k+2)
, (18)
cUmax =
pUmax
θ
=
[
1
θ2
]1/(k+2) [
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ(cM )kfE
]1/(k+2)
, (19)
cDmax = p
D
max = 4
1/(k+2)
[
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ(cM )kfE
]1/(k+2)
. (20)
Comparing these cut-off levels and price bounds yields
Proposition 1. The orderings of the cost cut-off levels, cρmax, and the upper price bounds, p
ρ
max,
under the different labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D are as follows:
i. cDmax > c
P
max > c
U
max,
ii. pPmax < min [p
U
max, p
D
max],
iii. pUmax > (<) p
D
max for θ
k > (<) 4.
The equilibrium cost cut-off is thus lowest under centralised bargaining and highest under
firm-level bargaining. The overall intensity of competition is highest (the upper price bound is
lowest) in the competitive environment. These two findings are directly related to our previous
observations that for any given market structure centralised bargaining induces tougher selection
and both bargaining regimes reduce profits.
The selection effect of centralised bargaining drives the least efficient firms out of the market and
therefore decreases the cost cut-off. At the same time, by decreasing expected profits of potential
entrants,13 centralised bargaining also discourages firm entry and thus reduces the ‘toughness’
of competition. Since tougher competition also induces tougher selection, the anti-competitive
effect works against but does not overturn the selection effect. Firm-level bargaining, in contrast,
does not induce tougher selection but ceteris paribus only decreases expected profits of surviving
firms. Lower expected profits again discourages entry and reduces the intensity of competition.
12These cut-off levels are derived under the assumption that cρmax < cM . For the different labour market
regimes ρ = P,U,D this assumption is fulfilled for cM >
√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γfE , cM > (1/θ)
√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γfE ,
cM > 2
√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γfE , respectively.
13Centralised bargaining does not only decrease expected profits by increasing pay but also by reducing the ex
ante probability of survival for potential entrants.
12
Firms can then charge higher equilibrium prices and entrants with a relatively high cost level
that would not break-even in a perfectly competitive environment (let alone under centralised
bargaining) remain in the market. Finally, comparing the ‘toughness’ of competition under
centralised and decentralised wage bargaining shows that the upper price bound is higher under
the former if and only if θk > 4. Competition is therefore weaker under regime U when the
specified wage floor θ is relatively high and/or the distribution of cost draws is skewed towards
less productive firms.
Having endogenised the market structure (as summarised by pmax), I will now assess how the
different labour market regimes affect firm-level performance. The (unweighted) average of some
performance measure zρ(c) under regime ρ = P,U,D is given by zρ =
[∫ cρmax
0 z
ρdG(c)
]
/G(cρmax).
The firm-level cost average cρ, average output qρ, and the average profit level Πρ can all be
written as simple functions of cρmax and p
ρ
max only:
cP =
k
k + 1
cPmax, c
U =
k
k + 1
cUmax, c
D =
k
k + 1
cDmax, (21)
qP =
1
2γ(k + 1)
pPmax, q
U =
1
2γ(k + 1)
pUmax, q
D =
1
4γ(k + 1)
pDmax, (22)
ΠP =
(pPmax)
2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)
, ΠU =
(pUmax)
2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)
, ΠD =
(pDmax)
2
8γ(k + 1)(k + 2)
. (23)
Combining these performance measures with equations (18) to (20) yields
Proposition 2. The orderings of the firm-level cost averages, cρ, the average output levels, qρ,
and the average profit levels, Πρ, under the different labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D are as
follows:
i. cD > cP > cU ,
ii. qU > qP > qD,
iii. ΠU > ΠP > ΠD.
Compared to both the competitive environment and to firm-level bargaining an uniform wage
above the competitive level boosts average firm productivity (lowers the cost average), and leads
to an increase in average output and profits. The positive impact on average productivity follows
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directly from the lower cost cut-off level (cf. Proposition 1i.). Two distinct effects are responsible
for the positive effect on average output and profits. First, the productivity-enhancing effect of
centralised wage bargaining also increases average output and profits because high productivity
firms generally produce and earn more. Second, at the level of the individual firm, the anti-
competitive effect of centralised bargaining enables firms to charge higher mark-ups, to expand
their production and to increase their profits. Despite of the higher wage rate associated with
unionisation, equilibrium profits of highly productive firms are then higher under sector-level
bargaining than they are in a flexible wage economy. For less productive firms, in contrast, the
negative direct effect of higher wages on profits prevails.14
In stark contrast to these results, firm-level bargaining reduces average productivity and de-
creases average output and profits. Firm-level bargaining allows entrants with relatively un-
favourable cost draws to remain in the market. Since low productivity firms tend to be small
and less profitable, the negative effect on average productivity also reduces average output and
profits. The individual firm can again benefit or lose from firm-level bargaining. While enter-
prises have to pay higher wages compared to the competitive benchmark (with the marginal firm
being the exception), surviving firms benefit from the lower equilibrium level of competition.
Since firm-specific wages are increasing in productivity, less productive enterprises benefit from
firm-level bargaining while more productive firms are hurt.15 Decentralised wage agreements
thus benefit low productivity firms and harm high productivity firms, while the opposite is true
for centralised wage agreements.
4 Unionization Structures and Welfare
After the previous section has studied the effect of bargaining structures on productivity and firm
performance, this section considers welfare. The indirect utility function in (6) shows that the
utility of the representative consumer depends on the price distribution, on product variety and
14Calculating and comparing equilibrium profits under the different labour market regimes show that gross
profits of firms with c < [θk/(k+2) − 1]cPmax/(θ − 1) are higher under centralised bargaining than they are in a
competitive labour market regime.
15The positive (anti-competitive) effect of decentralised bargaining on output and profits dominates for firms
with c > [2− 41/(k+2)]cPmax.
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on total income. While the model is well equipped for analysing product prices and variety in the
differentiated good sector, it is less appropriate for studying the income effects of unionisation.
Not only does the model postulate a constant marginal utility of income, it also abstracts from
economy-wide unemployment. Units of labour not demanded by firms in the differentiated good
sector are employed in the numeraire sector. Since union bargaining therefore rises pay but
does not create unemployment, unionisation increases income by construction. In what follows
I therefore focus on the first two determinants of welfare and treat income as exogenous. A
welfare analysis with endogenous income is relegated to the Appendix A.1.
4.1 The Mean and Variance of Prices
Utility of the representative consumer naturally decreases in the average price level. Moreover,
holding the mean of prices constant, an increase in the variance of prices increases utility, as the
representative consumer then re-optimises its consumption basket by shifting expenditures to
the numeraire good and to lower priced varieties. Using the appropriate wage rate, the profit-
maximising price of a variety produced with cost c under labour market regime ρ = P,U,D can
be written as:
pP (c) =
1
2
(
pPmax + c
)
, pU (c) =
1
2
(
pUmax + cθ
)
, pD(c) =
1
2
(
3/2pDmax + 1/2c
)
. (24)
The corresponding average price level pρ is given by
[∫ cρmax
0 p
ρ(c)dG(c)
]
/G(cρmax), while the
variance of prices can be calculated as (δρp)2 =
[∫ cρmax
0 (p
ρ(c)− pρ)2 dG(c)
]
/G(cρmax). Using
equations (15) and (24), I then obtain the following first and second moments of the different
price distributions:
pP =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
pPmax, p
U =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
pUmax, p
D =
4k + 3
4(k + 1)
pDmax, (25)
(δPp )
2 =
k(pPmax)
2
4(k + 1)2(k + 2)
, (δUp )
2 =
k(pUmax)
2
4(k + 1)2(k + 2)
. (δDp )
2 =
k(pDmax)
2
16(k + 1)2(k + 2)
. (26)
Given the equilibrium upper price bounds in equations (18) to (20), these moments can be
ordered as follows:
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Proposition 3. The orderings of the average price levels, pρ, and the variances of prices, (δρp)2,
under the different labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D are as follows:
i. pP < min
(
pU , pD
)
,
ii. pU < (>) pD for θk < (>) 4κ with κ = [(4k + 3)/(4k + 2)]k+2 > 1,
iii. (δUp )
2 > (δPp )
2 > (δDp )
2.
The average price level is lowest in a flexible wage economy. There are three reasons for
why the average price level in a flexible wage economy differs from the mean of prices under
centralised wage bargaining. First, a binding sector-wide wage floor increases unit costs cw.
Second, centralised bargaining also decreases competition in equilibrium. Both factors increase
ceteris paribus the profit-maximising price of a firm producing with cost c. The selection effect,
in contrast, reduces the average price level because it singles out the more productive and thus
cheaper firms. Equations (25) show that for any given upper price bound pPmax = p
U
max = pmax
average prices under the two regimes P and U are exactly identical. The direct effect on unit
costs and the selection effect of centralised wage bargaining hence cancel out. Therefore, the
anti-competitive effect of unionization prevails and pU strictly exceeds pP in equilibrium.
Firm-level bargaining also boosts pay and impedes competition (compared to the competitive
benchmark) but does not induce tougher selection. As a result, the average price level is larger
under decentralised bargaining than with a perfectly competitive labour market even when we
abstract from any anti-competitive effect and take pmax as exogenously given. It then also fol-
lows that for θk = 4 (and hence for pUmax = p
D
max) p
U is strictly lower than pD. The average price
level thus tends to be smaller under centralised than under decentralised bargaining, because
the former regime singles out more productive firms while the latter does not. Only for large θ,
when the intensity of competition under centralised bargaining is very weak, the ordering of pU
and pD can be reversed.
Finally, part iii. of proposition 3 shows that the variance of prices is largest under centralised
wage bargaining and lowest under firm-level bargaining. Compared to the flexible labour market
regime, centralised wage bargaining increases the average price level and thus the corresponding
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variance increases as well. Firm-level bargaining, in contrast, reduces the variance of prices.
Since firm-specific wages increase in productivity, firm-level bargaining compresses the distribu-
tion of marginal production costs cw(c). Prices charged by individual firms therefore depend
little on idiosyncratic cost draws but are primarily determined by the overall market structure
that is common to all firms (see equation 24). Firms with different cost levels therefore set
relatively similar prices and the price variance decreases.
4.2 Product Variety
Holding constant the distribution of prices, welfare increases in the number of firms and thus in
product variety. Using (25), equation (5) can be solved for the number of varieties consumed:
NP =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pPmax
pPmax
, NU =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pUmax
pUmax
, ND =
4(k + 1)γ
η
α− pDmax
pDmax
. (27)
Equations (27) reveal two factors that are of interest for the ordering of product variety under
the different labour market regimes. First, variety is positively associated with the ‘toughness’
of competition. Second, for any given pmax the number of consumed varieties is largest with
decentralised wage bargaining. This second finding mirrors proposition 3, according to which
the average price level is highest under decentralised wage bargaining (for any given pmax). A
high-price environment allows relatively many firms to survive and thus leads to greater product
variety. Accounting for both factors, product variety under the different labour market regimes
can be ordered as follows:
Proposition 4. The ordering of the number of consumed varieties, Nρ, under the different
labour market regimes ρ = P,U,D is as follows:
i. NP > NU ,
ii. NP > (<)ND for pPmax > (<) ϕα with 0 < ϕ = (2/4
1/(k+2) − 1) < 1,
iii. ND > (<)NU for θk > (<) 4λ with λ =
[
α/(2α− 41/(k+2)pPmax)
]k+2
< 1.16
16λ < 1 follows from ND > 0 (which implies α− pDmax = α− 41/(k+2)pPmax > 0).
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The number of consumed varieties is thus strictly larger in a flexible wage economy than under
centralised wage bargaining, reflecting the anti-competitive effect of the latter. Decentralised
wage bargaining, in contrast, can result in either more or less variety than a competitive labour
market. Strong demand for the differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire good (high
values of α) and a relatively large share of firms with an unfavourable cost draw (high values of k)
tend to increase ND relative to NP . Finally, the ordering of product variety under decentralised
and centralised wage bargaining is ambiguous and depends on the choice of θ. For θk = 4 and
thus for pUmax = p
D
max, however, N
D strictly exceeds NU .
4.3 Product Prices vs. Product Variety
The choice between centralised and decentralised bargaining involves a potential trade-off be-
tween product prices and product variety. Holding pmax constant, firm-level bargaining is associ-
ated with greater product variety but also with relatively higher prices and lower price variance.
Using the results for prices and variety, the indirect utility function in (6) can be rewritten as
UP = IP +
1
2η
(α− pPmax)
(
α− k + 1
k + 2
pPmax
)
, (28)
UU = IS +
1
2η
(α− pUmax)
(
α− k + 1
k + 2
pUmax
)
, (29)
UD = ID +
1
2η
(α− pDmax)
(
α− 2k + 3
2k + 4
pDmax
)
. (30)
Given the equilibrium upper price bounds, I can then assess the net effect of the different labour
market regimes on consumer welfare (holding income constant).
Proposition 5. Assuming income to be identical across the different labour market regimes, the
level of utility gained by the representative consumer under the different labour market regimes
ρ = P,U,D can be ordered as follows:
i. UP > min [UU , UD],
ii. UU > (<) UD for θk < (>)K with K > 4.
Abstracting from income effects, a competitive labour market results in the highest utility
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level. Unionisation is therefore always only second-best - independent from the level at which
wage bargaining takes place. Any positive income effect of unionisation could, of course, change
this result. In the Appendix, I show that with endogenous income UU can indeed rise above
UP for small values of θ > 1. The ordering of welfare under centralised and decentralised
wage bargaining is ambiguous and depends on the choice of θ. Since an increase in θ increases
pUmax, utility is generally decreasing in θ. As long as the uniform wage rate is not set too high,
moving from a centralised to a decentralised bargaining structure implies a loss in consumer
welfare. More specifically, UU is strictly larger than UP for θk = 4.17 The more favourable price
distribution induced by centralised bargaining then dominates the negative effect on product
variety. It is also informative that UU exceeds UD if θ is set so as to match the average wage
rate earned by workers under decentralised wage bargaining.18
5 Trade Liberalisation and Productivity
In this section I extend the model setup to a two-country setting and show that the positive
effect centralised bargaining has on average productivity can be overturned when firms face
international low-wage competition.19
5.1 The Open Economy Setting
Consider two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), that are identical except for their labour
market regimes. The representative cosumer in both countries share the same preferences that
result in the inverse demand function in (3). National goods markets are segmented and firms
incur per-unit iceberg trade costs, i.e. exporters have to ship t > 1 units of the good in order
for one unit to arrive at the export destination.
From equation (5) the upper price bound for positive demand in market i = H,F , pimax, is given
17This directly follows from (k + 1)/(k + 2) < (2k + 3)/(2k + 4) for k ≥ 1.
18The average wage rate under decentralised wage bargaining can be calculated by dividing the to-
tal wage bill in the differentiated good sector, N
[∫ cDmax
0
cDqD(c)dG(c)
]
/G(cDmax), by total employment,
N
[∫ cDmax
0
cDqD(c)wD(c)dG(c)
]
/G(cDmax). This yields (k + 1)/k. For this choice of θ the upper price bound
is strictly lower with centralised than with decentralised bargaining.
19In the Appendix A.2, I briefly show that with symmetric labour market regulations the main results derived
in the previous sections continue to hold in the open economy setting.
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by
pimax =
1
ηN i + γ
(γα+ ηN ipi), (31)
where N i is the total number of firms selling in market i and pi denotes their average price level.
Since markets are segmented and marginal production costs are constant, firms separately max-
imise their profits earned from domestic and export activities. Let qiL(c) and q
i
X(c) denote the
profit-maximising levels of output sold respectively in the local and in the export market by a
firm producing in country i with cost c. The corresponding profit-maximising prices are piL(c)
and piX(c). Profits earned from domestic and export sales are then given by
ΠiL(c) =
[
piL(c)− cwi
]
qiL(c), (32)
ΠiX(c) =
[
piX(c)− ctwi
]
qiX(c), (33)
where wi is the wage rate in country i. The corresponding first order conditions read
qiL(c) =
1
γ
[
piL(c)− cwi
]
, (34)
qiX(c) =
1
γ
[
piX(c)− ctwi
]
. (35)
Using the demand system in (4), the profit-maximising price and output choices then satisfy
piL(c) =
1
2
(
pimax + cw
i
)
, piX(c) =
1
2
(
pjmax + ctw
i
)
, (36)
qiL(c) =
1
2γ
(
pimax − cwi
)
, qiX(c) =
1
2γ
(
pjmax − ctwi
)
. (37)
These choices yield the following maximised profit levels:
ΠiL(c) =
1
4γ
(
pimax − cwi
)2
, (38)
ΠiX(c) =
1
4γ
(
pjmax − ctwi
)2
. (39)
A firm only chooses to sell in a market if it earns non-negative profits. This leads to (separate)
cost cut-off levels for either market. Let ciL and c
i
X denote the upper cost bounds of country i’s
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firms for selling in the local and in the export market, respectively. From equations (38) and
(39) these cut-offs must satisfy
ciL =
pimax
wi
, (40)
ciX =
pjmax
twi
. (41)
Notice that the cut-off levels of local producers in i and exporters from j to i are related through
cjX = (w
iciL)/(tw
j). Higher trade barriers make it harder for exporters to break even relative to
domestic firms. Cross-country differences in the wage level can mitigate or amplify this effect.
As in the closed economy setting, each start-up has to make an initial investment. Its cost level
is then drawn from a common and known distribution. Unrestricted entry in both countries
ensures that expected gross profits, which consist of expected profits from domestic and export
activities, are driven down to the fixed entry cost. In order to isolate the effect of different labour
market regulations, I assume that new entrants in Home and Foreign draw their cost level from
the same cost distribution G(c) = (c/cM )
k and have to pay the same fixed entry cost fE . The
free entry condition for country i can then be written as
∫ ciL
0
ΠiL(c)dG(c) +
∫ ciX
0
ΠiX(c)dG(c) = fE . (42)
Finally, labour market regulations in Home and Foreign differ. For the sake of brevity, I only
consider one specific scenario: firms in Home are subjected to centralised wage bargaining, while
the labour market in Foreign is perfectly competitive.20 The wage rate in Home therefore equals
wH = θ and is strictly above the unit wage that prevails in Foreign.
20As will become apparent in the next subsection, the main mechanism at work in an open but not in a closed
economy setting is a relocation effect. Start-ups prefer to enter in a low- rather than in a high-wage country.
Since centralised and decentralised wage bargaining both increase expected wage payments, the relocation effect
is present under both bargaining regimes.
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5.2 Trade, Labour Market Regulations, and Productivity
I start with rewriting the upper cost bounds for both markets by substituting the respective
wage rate into (40) and (41):
cHL =
pHmax
θ
, cHX =
pFmax
tθ
, (43)
cFL = p
F
max, c
F
X =
pHmax
t
. (44)
Likewise, profits from domestic and exporting activities of firms located in Home and Foreign,
respectively, can be written as
ΠHL (c) =
1
4γ
(
pHmax − cθ
)2
, ΠHX(c) =
1
4γ
(
pFmax − ctθ
)2
, (45)
ΠFL (c) =
1
4γ
(
pFmax − c
)2
, ΠFX(c) =
1
4γ
(
pHmax − ct
)2
. (46)
Suppose for the moment that pHmax and p
F
max are exogenously given and identical. Analogous to
the findings for the closed economy setting, centralised bargaining then induces tougher selection;
the cost cut-off levels for firms located in Home are ceteris paribus decreasing in θ. For any given
level of pmax centralised bargaining also depresses firm profits. Inspecting the maximised profit
values in (45) and (46) furthermore shows that for θ ≥ t firms are strictly better off by locating
in Foreign rather than in Home (as they can supply both markets at lower costs when based in
Foreign). To ensure a positive mass of domestic entrants in Home, I will therefore assume that
θ is strictly smaller than t. The free entry condition in (42) then holds as an equality.
To solve for the endogenous cost cut-offs levels, use (40) and (41) to rewrite profits as ΠHL (c) =
θ2
4γ
(
cHL − c
)2, ΠHX(c) = θ2t24γ (cHX − c)2 and ΠFL (c) = 14γ (cFL − c)2, ΠFX(c) = t24γ (cFX − c)2. Given
these expressions, the zero profit conditions can be written as
(cHL )
k+2 + t2(cHX)
k+2 =
γϕ
θ2
, (cFL )
k+2 + t2(cFX)
k+2 = γϕ, (47)
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where ϕ ≡ (k + 1)(k + 2)(cM )kfE . Using cHX = cFL/(tθ) and cFX = θcHL /t, these conditions can
be rewritten as a system of two equations in the two unknowns cHL , c
F
L :
(cHL )
k+2 + τ
(
cFL
θ
)k+2
=
γϕ
θ2
, (cFL )
k+2 + τ(θcHL )
k+2 = γϕ, (48)
with τ ≡ t−k being an inverse measure of trading costs. Solving this system yields
cHL =
[
2γϕ(θk − τ)
(1− τ2)θk+2
] 1
k+2
, cFL =
[
2γϕ(1− τθk)
1− τ2
] 1
k+2
. (49)
The cost cut-offs then pin down the upper price bounds through (43) and (44).
Before comparing the resulting equilibrium cut-off levels and the corresponding upper price
bounds for Home and Foreign, I analyse first how these cost thresholds change as trade barriers
are dismantled. Calculating the elasticities of ciL with respect to τ for i = H,F gives
∂cHL
∂τ
τ
cHL
=
τ(2τθk − τ2 − 1)
(k + 2)(1− τ2)(θk − τ) , (50)
∂cFL
∂τ
τ
cFL
=
τ(2τ − (1 + τ2)θk)
(k + 2)(1− τ2)(1− τθk) . (51)
Analysing these elasticities establishes
Proposition 6. Trade liberalization (i.e. an increase in τ) will always lower the cost cut-off
in Foreign. In contrast, trade liberalisation will increase (decrease) the cut-off in Home for
θk > (1 + τ2)/2τ . Furthermore, the elasticity of ciL with respect to τ is strictly larger in Home
than its is in Foreign, and it is increasing in θ in the former country while it is decreasing in θ
in the latter.
Proof. The proof is relegated to the Appendix A.3.
With cross-country differences in labour market regimes trade liberalisation has to two dis-
tinct effects on the cost cut-offs. First, lower trade barriers increase import competition in both
markets. As a result, demand price elasticities increase, the least productive firms are forced
to exit and cHL and c
F
L decrease. This is the mechanism highlighted by Melitz and Ottaviano
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(2008). If wages were identical across countries, dismantling trade barriers would always lower
the cost cut-offs in both countries. With cross-country wage differentials, however, trade liber-
alisation has an additional ‘relocation’ effect. As trade barriers fall, wage differentials become
an increasingly important criterion of location. Consequently, the number of entrants and thus
the intensity of competition increases in the low wage country and decreases in the high wage
country. The relocation effect is larger the higher the cross-country wage differential is. When
the wage rate in Home is sufficiently high relative to the level of trading barriers, the relocation
effect dominates and trade liberalisation strictly increases the cost cut-off in Home. Given (43),
it then also follows that the intensity of competition in market H decreases (pHmax increases).
Proposition 6 thus shows that in an open economy setting the selection effect of centralised
bargaining, described at length for the closed economy setting, is not only thwarted by the
anti-competitive effect of higher wages but also by a relocation effect. For hight trade costs the
selection effect prevails and the cost cut-off is lower in Home than in Foreign. However, the
ordering can be reversed as trade barriers are dismantled. This is demonstrated in
Proposition 7. The orderings of the cut-off levels, ciL, and the upper price bounds, p
i
max, for
country i = H,F are as follows:
i. cHL > (<) c
F
L for τ > (<) (θ
k+2 − θk)/(θ2k+2 − 1),
ii. pHmax > p
F
max.
Having explicitly calculated the cost cut-off levels and the corresponding upper price bounds,
I can now assess firm-level performance. For doing so, notice first that in some market i the
cost of domestic firms cwi ∈ [0, ciL] and the delivered cost of exporters tcwj ∈ [0, tcjX ] = [0, ciL]
have identical distributions over the same support, as given by G(c) = (c/ciL)
k. Average firm
performance of local firms in i and exporters from j to i are then also identical, since their
output and profit levels depend only on (delivered) costs and on the common upper price bound
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pimax. More specifically, I find that
qHL = q
F
X =
pHmax
2γ(k + 1)
, qFL = q
H
X =
pFmax
2γ(k + 1)
, (52)
ΠHL = Π
F
X =
(pHmax)
2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)
, ΠFL = Π
H
X =
(pFmax)
2
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)
. (53)
Given Proposition 7ii., these average performance measures can be ordered as follows:
Proposition 8. Output sold in the local market, qiL, and profits earned from domestic sales, Π
i
L,
are on average higher for firms located in Home. Thus, the following orderings are established:
i. qHL = q
F
X > q
F
L = q
H
X ,
ii. ΠHL = Π
F
X > Π
F
L = Π
H
X .
Average profits and sales are thus higher in Home, the country characterised by centralised
wage bargaining. This result resembles proposition 2 derived in the closed economy setting.
However, in a global world economy not only domestic firms but also foreign enterprises that
export from Foreign to Home benefit from the relatively low intensity of competition in Home.
Likewise, both local enterprises based in Foreign and exporters from Home to Foreign suffer
from the intense competition in Foreign.
Finally, I assess cross-country differences in product variety and in the mean of prices; income is
considered in the Appendix A.4. The average price of a variety sold in country i reflects prices
charged by both local firms, piL(c), and by exporting firms from j, p
j
X(c). I previously described
that the cost of domestic firms and the delivered cost of exporters share the same distribution.
This also leads to matching price distributions. The average price of domestic firms in a country
and of exporters to that country are thus identical and given by pi =
[∫ ciL
0 p
i
LdG(c)
]
/G(ciL).
Combining this with equation (36) yields:
pH =
2k + 1
2k + 2
pHmax, p
F =
2k + 1
2k + 2
pFmax. (54)
The number of varieties sold in each market can then be calculated by substituting (54) into
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(31) and rearranging. Doing so gives
NH =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pHmax
pHmax
, NF =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− pFmax
pFmax
. (55)
Given propositions 6 and 7, I can conclude:
Proposition 9. The number of varieties in Foreign is strictly higher and their average price
strictly lower than in Home. Trade liberalisation increases product variety and decreases the
average price level in Foreign. In Home, trade liberalisation increases (decreases) variety and
decreases (increases) average prices for θk < (> ) (1 + τ2)/2τ .
The flexible wage country thus features strictly lower prices and higher product variety than
the high wage country. These orderings thus correspond to the findings for the closed economy.
More interestingly, trade liberalisation, by weakening competition, can actually decrease product
variety and increase prices in the high wage country. This result is squarely at odds with the
usual finding that bilateral trade liberalisation increases consumer welfare by intensifying import
competition. In contrast, for the low wage country the conventional wisdom holds and economic
integration increases product variety and lowers prices.
Since the results for product variety and average prices in the open economy are identical to the
closed-economy case, welfare can be written in a way identical to (28) and (29):
UH = IH +
1
2η
(α− pHmax)
(
α− k + 1
k + 2
pHmax
)
, (56)
UU = IF +
1
2η
(α− pFmax)
(
α− k + 1
k + 2
pFmax
)
. (57)
As the intensity of competition is higher in Foreign than it is in Home, welfare is also strictly
higher in the low wage economy (abstracting again from income effects). Furthermore, trade
liberalisation increases welfare in Foreign but may decrease welfare in Home.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied how the level at which collective wage contracts are negotiated affects
firm productivity, firm performance, and consumer welfare. While centralised bargaining induces
tougher selection among heterogeneous producers and thus increases average productivity, firm-
level bargaining allows less productive entrants to stay in the market, as inter-firm productivity
differences will find consideration in firm-level wage settlements. Centralised bargaining also
results in higher average output and in higher profit levels than either decentralised bargaining
or a competitive labour market. Moreover, I have shown that moving from centralised to de-
centralised bargaining is not necessarily welfare-improving. While firm-level bargaining tends
to increase product variety, it also entails higher product prices.
The paper has also highlighted that the effects of national labour market regulations may change
when goods markets become global. In a two-country model of trade between a rigid-wage and
a flexible-wage economy, centralised bargaining still induces tougher selection. Yet unionisa-
tion also induces firms to enter in the low- rather than in the high-wage country. This reduces
competition and average productivity in the latter. As trade barriers fall, cross-country wage
differentials become an increasingly important criterion for firms in their choice of where to lo-
cate. Trade liberalisation can thus reduce competition, lower productivity, and depress welfare
in the unionised economy.
The predictions of the theoretical model can be useful in guiding future empirical work on the
relation between unionisation, productivity, and firm performance. Existing empirical studies
mainly seek to identify the effect of a change in unionisation status on an individual firm in
a given industry.21 My work suggests that a more complete analysis requires complementary
evidence on the relation between unionisation structures and average firm performance at the
industry level that also accounts for the endogeneity of the market structure.
21Evidence on the link between unionisation and productivity is inconclusive, while the bulk of studies find
unionised workplaces to be less profitable than non-unionised ones (cf. Metcalf, 2003, and Hirsch, 2004, for recent
surveys of the literature). These findings are not at odds with the theoretical predictions of the present paper.
Holding the market structure constant, collective bargaining unambiguously decreases firm-level profits.
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A Appendix
A.1 Endogenous Income and Welfare in the Closed Economy Setting
In this subsection, I endogenise income. Overall profits net of entry costs, i.e. gross profits of all
surviving firms minus the start up costs of all entrants, are zero. Wages are therefore the only
source of income in the model. The wage bill of the differentiated product sector can be calcu-
lated by multiplying the average wage bill of a single firm, W ρ =
[∫ cρmax
0 c
ρqρ(c)wρ(c)dG(c)
]
/G(cρmax)
by the total number of firms, Nρ. Units of labour not demanded by firms in the differentiated
good sector are employed in the numeraire sector and earn the competitive wage rate of one.
Labour income in the numeraire good sector thus equals total labour supply minus the units of
labour employed in the differentiated good sector. The latter can be found by multiplying the
average labour demand of a single firm, Eρ =
[∫ cρmax
0 c
ρqρ(c)dG(c)
]
/G(cρmax), by the total num-
ber of firms. Summarising the above, total income Iρ under labour market regime ρ = P,U,D
is given by WBρNρ + (L− EρNρ). Rearranging gives
Iρ = L+
(
W
ρ
E
ρ − 1
)
E
ρ
Nρ. (58)
Equation (58) demonstrates that total income can be apportioned into labour supply L, which
equals the total wage bill in case all workers were employed in the numeraire good sector, plus
the rent earned by labour in the differentiated good sector. The rent increases with the average
wage differential between the two sectors (W ρ/Eρ−1) and with employment in the differentiated
product sector (EρNρ).
With a perfectly competitive labour market the inter-sectoral wage differential is zero and income
just equals L. With centralised bargaining the wage differential is θ−1 and firm-level bargaining
elicits an average differential of (k + 1)/k − 1. Multiplying the respective wage differential by
the corresponding employment level and substituting into (58) yields:
IP = L, IU = L+
k(θ − 1)
θ
(α− pUmax)pUmax
η(k + 2)
, ID = L+
(α− pDmax)pDmax
η(k + 2)
(59)
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Given the full employment assumption and the fact that bargaining rises pay, labour income
under both bargaining regimes exceeds income in the flexible wage economy. The ordering of
IU and ID is, however, ambiguous and depends on the rent earned by labour under the the two
bargaining modes. Very low and very high values of θ cause the rent earned under centralised
bargaining to approach zero (and IU to fall below ID). Small values of θ level the inter-sectoral
wage differential, while very large values marginalise employment in the differentiated good
sector. For intermediate levels of θ, however, labour income under centralised wage bargaining
can exceed income under firm-level bargaining. Consider exemplarily the case of θk = 4 (and
hence pUmax = p
D
max).
22 Income under centralised bargaining is then larger (smaller) than income
under firm-level bargaining for k > 2 (k < 2). While the wage differential is strictly larger under
regime U at θk = 4,23 more firms are active under regime D (cf. proposition 4ii.). Finally,
average labour demand per firm, E, is larger (smaller) under centralised bargaining for k > 2
(k < 2).24
With endogenous income, utility under labour market regime ρ, Uρ can be written as:
UP = L+
1
2η
(α− pPmax)
(
α− k + 1
k + 2
pPmax
)
, (60)
UU = L+
1
2η
(α− pUmax)
(
α− 2k − θ(k − 1)
θ(k + 2)
pUmax
)
, (61)
UD = L+
1
2η
(α− pDmax)
(
α− 2k − 1
2k + 4
pDmax
)
. (62)
For small values of θ centralised bargaining can actually result in higher welfare than a competi-
tive labour market. To see this possibility, notice that UP and UU converge as θ approaches the
competitive wage rate of one. It then remains to be shown that at θ = 1 utility under centralised
bargaining can be increasing in θ. Differentiating UU with respect to θ gives
∂UU
∂θ
= −Υ [2pUmax(2 + k(θ − 1)− θ) + α(3θ − 4)] , (63)
22More generally, IU is larger (smaller) than ID for k (θ − 1) (α− pUmax) > (<) (4θ2)1/(k+2) (α− pDmax).
2341/k is strictly larger than (k + 1)/k for k ≥ 1.
24Calculating average labour demand explicitly gives E
U
=
(
k(pUmax)
2
)
/ (2νθ) and E
D
=
(
k(pDmax)
2
)
/ (4ν)
with ν = γ(k + 1)(k + 2). For θk = 4 E
U
is larger than E
D
provided that 41/k < 2.
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where Υ is strictly positive. The sign of (63) is indeed indeterminate for 1 ≤ θ < 4/3 (but
strictly negative thereafter). It then follows that centralised bargaining can in principle improve
welfare by increasing income and the variance of prices.
A.2 The Open Economy Setting with Symmetric Labor Market Regimes
In this subsection, I consider the two country setting with symmetric labour market regulations.
Since the two trading partners Home and Foreign are then identical, I drop the country super-
script i = H,F . Instead, the superscript ρ = P,U is used to distinguish between country pairs
sharing a perfectly competitive labour market and a centralised wage bargaining regime, respec-
tively. Given the symmetry of the model, I shall only present equations for Home. Analogous
equations exist for Foreign as well.
Using (40) and (41), for each country pair ρ = P,U firm-level profits (34) and (35) can be
rewritten as
ΠPL (c) =
1
4γ
(
cPL − c
)2
, ΠPX(c) =
t2
4γ
(
cPX − c
)2
, (64)
ΠUL (c) =
θ2
4γ
(
cUL − c
)2
, ΠUX(c) =
t2θ2
4γ
(
cUX − c
)2
. (65)
The corresponding free entry conditions are then given by:
(cPL )
k+2 + t2(cPX)
k+2 = 2γϕ, (cUL )
k+2 + t2(cUX)
k+2 =
2γϕ
θ2
, (66)
with ϕ ≡ (k + 1)(k + 2)(cM )kfE . Using cρX = cρL/t, these equations can then be solved for the
cost thresholds cρL and the corresponding upper price bounds:
cPL = p
P
max =
(
2γϕ
1 + ρ
)1/(k+2)
, (67)
cUL =
pUmax
θ
=
(
1
θ2
)1/(k+2)( 2γϕ
1 + ρ
)1/(k+2)
. (68)
Inspecting these expressions shows that - analogous to the closed economy setting - the cut-off
level cPL strictly exceeds c
U
L and the corresponding price bound p
P
max falls short of p
U
max. With
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symmetric labour markets the orderings of both the cost cut-offs and the upper price bounds
established in the closed economy model carry over to the open economy setting. Furthermore,
without cross-country differences in the wage rate, trade liberalisation just increases import
competition and thus always induces tougher selection among heterogeneous producers.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. For a positive mass of entrants in Home, θ has to be smaller than t. This also implies
that θk − τ and 1 − τθk (with τ = 1/tk) are both positive in sign. The elasticity of cHL with
respect to τ is then positive (negative) for θk > (<) (1+τ2)/2τ . The corresponding elasticity of
Foreign is negative for θk > 2τ/(τ + 1). This latter condition is always fulfilled for the relevant
parameter values t > θ > 1, 0 < τ < 1. Furthermore, differentiating the two elasticities with
respect to τ gives
∂
(
∂cHL
∂τ
τ
cHL
)
/∂τ = τ/
[
(k + 2)(1− τ2)(θk − τ)2
]
> 0 (69)
∂
(
∂cFL
∂τ
τ
cFL
)
/∂τ = τ(τ2 − 1)/
[
(k + 2)(1− τ2)(1− τθk)2
]
< 0 (70)
where the respective signs directly follow from τ < 1.
A.4 Endogenous Income in the Open Economy Setting
As in the closed economy setting, the unit wage in Foreign implies IF = L. Income in Home,
on the other hand, is given by L + (θ − 1)EH where EH are the units of labour employed by
firms producing differentiated varieties in Home. Production destined for the domestic market
requires on average
E
H
L =
kpHmax
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)θ
(71)
units of labour. In addition, exporting firms will demand
E
H
X =
kpFmax
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)tθ
(72)
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labour units for their export activities.
Total employment can then be found by multiplying these average employment measures by the
number of non-exporters and exporters in Home, respectively. Given a positive mass of entrants
NHE in country H, there are G(c
H
L )N
H
E non-exporters and G(c
H
X)N
H
E exporters producing in H.
In order to obtain NHE , I split the total number of firms selling in market i, N
i, into domestic
producers in i, G(ciL)N
i
E , and exporters from j to i, G(c
j
X)N
j
E . The conditions G(c
i
L)N
i
E +
G(cjX)N
j
E = N
i (holding for each country i = H,F ) can then be solved for the number of
entrants in both markets:
NHE =
(cM )k
1− τ2
[
1
(cHD)k
NH − τθ
k
(cFD)k
NF
]
=
2(cM )kγ(k + 1)
(1− τ2)η
[
α− cHDθ
(cHD)k+1θ
− τθ
k(α− cFD)
(cFD)k+1
]
, (73)
NFE =
(cM )k
1− τ2
[
1
(cFD)k
NF − τθ
k
(cHD)k
NH
]
=
2(cM )kγ(k + 1)
(1− τ2)η
[
α− cFD
(cFD)k+1
− τ(α− c
H
Dθ)
(θcHD)k+1
]
. (74)
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